Washington Summit Agreement 1987

September 8, 1987 Meeting with the National Security Planning Group [Briefing Memorandum for President Reagan from National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci] When the show returns tonight, the period will be three years until the end of 1987. April 14, 1987 Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz. Withdrawal. Gorbachev also faced opposition, not only from the negotiations of the FN treaty, but also from his perestroika reform programmes. [5] Although Gorbachev`s frustration was replaced by more than 150 senior defence ministers and officers after the Mathias Rust incident,[6] Gorbachev`s frustration was only reinforced when, just two months before the Washington summit, Boris Yeltsin, then a Politburo candidate and Gorbachev supporter, denounced the Soviet Secretary General and resigned from his post at an unprecedented and unprecedented stage. [7] Although, according to Reagan`s Foreign Minister, George P. Shultz, the Soviet head of state, at his meeting in Moscow at the end of October was unusually controversial in finalizing the terms of the FNI treaty, “Shultz had barely unpacked his pockets in Washington before Moscow came to announce that Gorbachev would soon deny the summit.

Shevardnadze will be in Washington within two days to discuss the final details of the ISP Treaty and the summit. [9] The documents published for the first time provide the reader with a unique and unprecedented opportunity to review the internal consultation process between the two parties and the negotiations before and during the December 1987 Summit. September 10, 1987 Secretary-General Gorbachev`s letter to President Reagan, Russian and English versions [documents 7a and 7b] This two-page cover memo to Secretary Shultz by the head of the Foreign Ministry`s intelligence and research office summarizes a seven-page study of the INR that examines “what some of the Wild Cards might be on the agenda of the summit.” Although, as a general rule, precisely in his assessment of Gorbachev`s intentions, even the foreign ministry analysts, who are closest to Shultz`s vision of Soviet behavior, do not predict many of Gorbachev`s surprises during the summit, such as offering to Central America and conventional forces in Europe. The prediction of “something sparkling in Afghanistan” would be absent for a few months, but the anticipation of a possible SDI compromise would be only slightly behind Gorbachev`s thinking. President Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev concluded their summit in Washington yesterday with a declaration of mutual success after reaching an agreement that avoids the crucial issue of limiting the US strategic defense initiative. December 8, 1987 Interview between S.F. Akhromeev and P. Nitze at the U.S. Department of State December 29, 1987 National Security Code Number 292: Organization of the Inf Ratification Effort [Document 23] Thus, despite external complications, most of the details of the INF Treaty had been drawn up at the time of the summit. At least a week before the meeting, the New York Times reported that “the Soviet leader and President Reagan should sign a treaty that eliminates short-range and medium-range missiles from their nations… While acknowledging that the debate on “long-term strategic nuclear weapons reduction” faces obstacles.

[10] When the summit was held at the White House.